Reforma europskog agencijskog upravljanja: više kontrole, veća odgovornost by Anamarija Musa


























Reforming the European Union Agency 





Original scientific paper / izvorni znanstveni rad
Received / primljeno:  18. 6. 2013.
Accepted / prihvaćeno: 21. 3. 2014.
Agencification in the European Union has mainly procee-
ded without firm legal framework and horizontal measures, 
leading to the creation of numerous more or less indepen-
dent specialised administrative organisations with diverse 
structure and functions. The EU institutional setting and 
the nature of EU regulation have represented the powerful 
engines of agencification. The existence of agencies had 
not been envisaged in the primary legislation before the 
Lisbon Treaty, while the more extensive data on agencies 
emerged only recently. The paper aims to analyse the ele-
ments of the EU agency governance and to highlight the 
direction of the recent reforms of EU agencies. The paper 
outlines the rationale and legal basis for agencies, presents 
a short overview of the development of agencification, and 
gives insight into recent agency reforms. The recent de-
velopments show the evolving construction of common 
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norms and practices for agencies, which should enable 
more control and their greater accountability. 
Key words: European agencies, agencification, EU gover-
nance
1. Introduction1
The process of agencification in the meaning of delegation to the specia-
lized and professional administrative organizations is an enduring feature 
of the EU governance, making the EU in this respect no different from 
its member states. Agencification as a feature of contemporary governan-
ce and a global phenomenon (Pollitt, Talbot, 2004) in many countries 
has led to the creation of numerous agencies, justified by the reasons of 
effectiveness and efficiency under the new public management (NPM) 
doctrine (Christensen, Laegreid, 2007) or the need for regulation insu-
lated from political pressures within the new regulatory states (Majone, 
1996, 2003). Agencies are considered to be organisations that perform 
public tasks at arm’s length from the central government, for the reason of 
their superiority over traditional ministries in terms of specialisation and 
expertise and the absence of direct politicisation (Pollitt et al., 2004). The 
translation of the concept of agency in different institutional contexts has 
led to a different definition of agency, types of internal design and variety 
in agency relationship with its environment (politics, users, market; see 
Pollitt, Bouckaert, 2004; Pollitt, Talbot, 2004). However, after years of 
mostly uncontrolled agencification, many states have taken various mea-
sures to put agencies under control, especially with regard to their outputs 
and performance, transparency, spending, and financial management, but 
have also tried to generate a more unified structure of agency governance 
as a form of the ex ante agency control (see Verhoest et al., 2012). The 
post-NPM era combined with the good governance doctrine reflected 
itself in the reform processes enhancing coordination and centralisation 
that sought to improve the governance in general (see Christensen, Lae-
greid, 2007). Greater accountability and effectiveness had to be achieved 
1  The first version of this paper was presented at the IPSA Research Committee 32 
Conference Europeanization of Public Administration and Policy: Sharing Norms, Values 
and Practices, 4–7 April 2013, Dubrovnik, Croatia. I would like to thank the participants 
and reviewers for valuable comments.
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with the help of clearer organisational and functional rules. Hence, the 
role of law and regulation in the government became more prominent 
(similarly Hood et al., 2004).
The agencies are an important element of the EU governance, which da-
tes back to the beginning of the 1970s. Since then, the agencification 
process has led to the creation of more than forty agencies in various 
policy domains, with different tasks and peculiarities of the governance 
structure, functions, and relations to the other bodies or institutions. In 
2011, decentralised agencies2 employed more than 5.000 people and re-
ceived € 737m from the EU budget. The reception of agency model as 
a suitable means of achieving EU policy targets was visible even in the 
period of moratorium on the establishment of new agencies (2008), as the 
proliferation of agencies remained unstoppable. However, as a part of the 
complex and insufficiently transparent ‘executive governance’ in the EU 
(Trondal, 2006; Trondal, Jeppesen, 2006), agencies came into the focus of 
the EU institutional and governance reform in the past years. Greater po-
litical accountability, greater effectiveness and efficiency as well as more 
transparency have been set as main goals of the reform process.
This paper’s aim is to provide insight into the recent EU agency gover-
nance reform, its drivers, and directions of change. What are the main 
steps in the reform agenda? What circumstances gave the impetus for 
the reform? Which actors are included and what are their positions? 
Which goals are to be achieved? What is the direction of the reform me-
asures? Consequently, the paper gives some insight into the explanatory 
variables – the institutional setting, the main actors and main drivers, 
as well as the measures taken in the reform process. It highlights the 
institutional context of the EU as an explanatory factor for the reform 
process, but also outlines the main directions of change which might be 
conducive for the similar reforms in the member states, through proce-
sses of diffusion and isomorphic pressures of the Europeanization pro-
cess (Radaelli, 2003).
2  Agencies that are not defined as ‘decentralised’, are not included. Data from Euro-
pean Commission Press Release, Breakthrough as EU Institutions agree common approach 
on agencies, Brussels, 13 June 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-604_en.htm
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2. The Emergence and Types of EU Agencies
2.1.  The Rationale for the EU Agencies: Where Do  
They Come from?
The reasons for delegation to the independent agencies in the EU are in 
greater part similar to those fuelling agencification in nation states and re-
lated to the NPM approach to decentralisation and specialisation, as well 
as to the concept of independent regulation. In essence, agencification is 
justified by the need for expert and technical knowledge insulated from 
political pressures, with greater organisational and personnel flexibility, 
and greater capability to frame technical regulation which can hardly be 
absorbed by legislatures, together with the need for allowing executive to 
focus on policy and political issues. However, along with usual arguments, 
several features of the EU institutional architecture and policy have been 
conducive for the development of EU agencies, with implementation de-
ficit, institutional balance, and the necessities of respective EU policies 
being the most prominent ones. 
First, the EU’s institutional setting is considered to be conducive for the 
formation of agencies as specialized and relatively independent bodies 
with regard to the main political actors. The holder of the executive power 
is the Commission, which has profiled itself as the motor of the EU inte-
gration. This has led the main political actors to be in favour of agencies 
to promote their specific interests (Dehousse, 2008). The Council, on 
one hand, delegates the tasks to the agencies to avoid strengthening the 
already powerful Commission. In this way, the member states remain in 
control via management boards usually comprised of the representatives 
of the member states (MS), and they host agencies’ seats on their territo-
ries. On the other hand, the Commission, already a giant institution, does 
not object to delegation to the agencies, because it allows it to focus on 
the ‘political’ or policy issues, thus promoting itself as a policy actor in the 
political arena (Majone, Surdej, 2006; Curtin, 2007: 524).3 In addition, 
3  As Hofmann and Morini (2012) argue, the distinction between political and tech-
nical matter also favours agencification – Commission as primarily political executive is 
assisted by the agencies as expert bodies, which should provide scientific assessments based 
on technical evaluations and coordinate relevant expert actors (e.g. national agencies), 
which allows the Commission to focus on political issues and present itself as a ‘motor of 
integration’. The Commission outlined this view explicitly in its 2001 White paper for the 
Commission, the creation of agencies is also a useful way of ensuring it focuses resources 
on core tasks (p. 24).
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the Commission encourages the delegation of tasks to the agencies at the 
European level and the creation of a network of national regulators in a 
particular area in order to legitimize its decisions by their expertise and 
to ensure implementation (Trondal, 2006), thereby avoiding cooperation 
with national ministries (Egeberg, 2006). Finally, the European Parlia-
ment supports agencies because in this way it gains stronger influence on 
the establishment via co-decision procedure and avoids concentration of 
power in other institutions, namely the Commission. Hence, the Parlia-
ment enjoys a more powerful position vis à vis agencies than in relation 
to the Commission – several instruments of control over agencies set the 
main control into the hands of the EP (reporting, ex ante appointments, 
hearings of the candidates, ombudsman, other independent control bo-
dies such as the Court of Auditors). As noted by Rittberger and Wonka 
(2011) »agencies are said to represent a ‘compromise’ reflecting the inte-
rests of their multiple principals (the Council, the Commission, and even 
the European Parliament).« 
The other driver of agencification is the specific set-up of European gov-
ernance which is conducive to the implementation deficit – the Commission, 
as the executive, relies heavily on the implementation by member states’ 
administrations. Therefore, a large number of agencies, boards and other 
entities serve as a compensation for the implementation deficit, i.e. the 
fact that the EU does not have its own administrative apparatus for the for-
mulation and implementation of policies. Thus, agencies may be regarded 
as an attempt to solve the problem of institutional deficit of the European 
Union and its dependence on the implementation at the national level 
(Baldwin, Cave, 1999: 163). Instead of leaving the implementation of an 
EU policy or its segment in its entirety to the member states, the EU 
compensates for implementation deficit by establishing agencies within 
respective policies with the task to ensure coordination, provide technical 
support, construct information base, or even independently implement 
regulations. At the same time, the separation of highly specialized tasks 
into an agency, relieves the Commission’s already weak administrative 
capacity of a heavy burden and allows its resources to be redirected to the 
policy function, especially in terms of initiatives and evaluation and moni-
toring, with the technical basis provided by professional and independent 
agencies. Similar agencification has been taking place at the MS level, 
with national agencies being established in the course of implementation 
of European policies, thus creating the networks of agencies (national 
plus EU agencies) in diverse policy areas. In sum, in order to cure the 
EU’s implementation deficit, the networks of the EU and national level 
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agencies serve as a means of harmonization or coordination of policies 
and their implementation.
Finally, the logic of the European project favours delegation to professional 
and specialised bodies. The idea of the EU as the regulatory state (Ma-
jone, 1996, 2003) requires regulatory policies to be developed as a main 
governance tool, in response to »de-politicization of the common market« 
(Majone, 1996: 330). Thus, in an effort to achieve the main objectives of 
the EU (the common market), the MS abandon public ownership and 
planning, and turn over the regulation of privatized monopolies to the 
expert agencies. In other words, an increase of the ‘statutory regulation’ 
in Europe, i.e. the regulation through independent regulatory bodies in 
the EU and its MS, is a result of the strategy of privatization and dereg-
ulation, inspired by global regulatory reform. It is also connected to the 
EU’s legislative activity that has been getting stronger since the end of 
the 1980s (Majone, 1996) – regulation, rather than providing services, 
becomes the main mode of action of the member states and the EU it-
self (Scharpf, 1997). Hence, the EU is a regulatory state keen on delega-
tion to professional bodies (Majone, 1996) in order to achieve legitimacy 
of its decisions. The growing dominance of expert bodies (non-political, 
non-majoritarian, see Coen, Thatcher, 2008) is in line with both the EU’s 
non-political character (outside political institutions) and regulatory state 
agenda. The proliferation of agencies and agency-like institutions based 
on expertise, professionalization, and specialisation is a key feature of the 
EU (Levi-Faur, 2011). The Commission frequently emphasizes that the 
idea behind the creation of agencies is to »make the executive more ef-
fective at the European level in highly specialised technical areas requir-
ing advanced expertise and continuity, credibility and visibility of public 
action ... The main advantage of using the agencies is that their decisions 
are based on purely technical evaluations of very high quality and are 
not influenced by political or contingent considerations« (Communicati-
on 2002/718: 5). Thus, the technical and scientific complexity, which is 
one of the causes of delegation in the modern regulatory state (Majone, 
2003), is particularly prominent in the EU. The rise of agencies at the Eu-
ropean level might also be attributed to the strengthening of the concept 
of subsidiarity (Hofmann, 2010).
2.2.  The Process of the EU Agencification
There are numerous European agencies which differ according to the-
ir type, size, formal structure, funding, appointment and composition of 
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management structures, range of functions, their importance, and locati-
on. However, even within this seemingly diverse context it is possible to 
identify some elements of the EU agency model. 
The agencification in the EU has developed in several waves (see Table 1 
in Appendix). The first agencies were established in the 1970s as a respon-
se to the development of the labour market (Eurofound and Cedefop). 
Their tasks consisted mainly in collecting data and preparing expert 
analysis in given areas. The second wave of agencification emerged in the 
1990s, with eight new agencies being established in the period 1990–1994 
in the first pillar to help implementing newly developed policies (e.g. for 
pharmaceuticals, environmental protection, market harmonization, etc.) 
and additional two in the late 1990s (in the area of human rights and aid). 
They were meant to facilitate the functioning of the single market, with a 
somewhat broader authority, which mainly consisted in issuing decisions 
in individual cases. In the third and most intense wave (2000–2009), nine 
new agencies were founded in the first pillar following the development 
of the EU policies related to transport, data security, fisheries, food sa-
fety, health, chemicals, electric power, etc. In addition, five agencies were 
established under second and third pillars and six agencies emerged as 
executive agencies. 
Despite efforts to stop or at least disregard agencification, it continued in 
the period 2009–2013, creating seven new agencies for regulation in the 
key areas as a response to the shaken stability of the EU. Three agencies 
were established for the purpose of regulation of the financial services 
market, which is of crucial importance for the political and economic sta-
bility of the Union. Two agencies were established in the field of regula-
tion of public services, as cornerstones of the EU economy (energy ser-
vices, ACER, and electronic communications, BEREC), followed by two 
agencies in the field of justice and home affairs, in which the cooperation 
between the countries has been intensified as a response to the security 
problems, border protection and the fight against international crime.
Before the Lisbon treaty, the typology of EU agencies included those in 
the first pillar (EC), second pillar agencies (CFSP) and third pillar agen-
cies (JHA), two agencies under EURATOM and one agency outside the 
pillar structure. After Lisbon, first and third pillar agencies were merged 
into the category of ‘decentralised agencies’, since the pillar structure was 
abolished. 
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Table 1. Agencies in the EU – Waves and Legal Bases
The EU 
agencies



















Art. 114 or 
352 TFEU  









Art. 114 or 352 
TFEU or sector 
policy provi-
sion; regulation; 











2 – – 1 – 3 3
2nd wave 
– 1990s








5 - 2 – – 7 44
Total 
2013
28 3 5 3 6 45 44
Source: Author 
According to functional criteria, decentralised agencies are usually classifi-
ed as decision-making agencies, which adopt individual decisions that are 
legally binding on third parties (e.g. CVPO, OHIM, EASA, ECHA); agen-
cies which provide direct assistance to the Commission (and to the MS) in 
the form of technical or scientific advice and/or inspection reports (EMSA, 
EFSA, ERA, EMEA); agencies conducting operational activities (EAR, 
GSA, CFCA, FRONTEX, EUROJUST, EUROPOL and CEPOL); infor-
mation and coordination agencies (which  gather, analyse, and disseminate 
information or coordinate networks; (e.g. CEDEFOP, EUROFOUND, 
EEA, ETF, EMCCDA, EU-OSHA, ENISA, ECDC, FRA, EIGE); and 
service agencies (CDT). Some of the recently established agencies in the 
area of financial markets, energy or electronic communication have even 
broader powers with regard to decision-making, and hence approach to 
genuine regulatory agencies. Executive agencies, however, are those esta-
blished as semi-autonomous agencies of the Commission.4
4   Executive agencies, established under Regulation 58/2003, follow standardised 
structure and the menu of functions, with the Commission supervising their activities, and 
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Some authors claim diversity of EU agencies (Andoura, Timmermans, 
2008), but compared to the chaotic diversification of agencies at the na-
tional level, EU agencies seem to follow a similar pattern with regard to 
their organisation and practice.
2.3. The Legal Framework for the EU Agencies
In the past decades, the most important legal provisions applicable to 
agencies were enshrined in the Treaties but, as in many European countri-
es, agencies were not systematically treated as a distinct institutional tool 
for the implementation of policies. Due to the diversified policy structu-
re, and complex relations between the institutional actors and member 
states, the EU legal framework was ambiguous with regard to the esta-
blishment of agencies, while the Treaties before the Lisbon Treaty had 
completely overlooked the agencies as institutional actors.5
Until 2009, the main division of agencies was based on the legal basis for 
their establishment as set by the Treaties. Therefore, the differentiation 
existed between first pillar agencies (EU policies), second pillar agencies 
(Common Foreign and Security Agencies), and third pillar agencies (Ju-
stice and Home Affairs – JHA), EURATOM agencies, executive agenci-
es, and other agencies (European Institute for Technology and Innovation 
– EIT). The legal basis for the establishment was given by the Treaties 
(Art. 308 and 95 TEC, with some agencies established directly under the 
Treaties), but the legal instruments were different: in the first pillar, the 
agencies were established by the regulations (of the Council; later of the 
Council and the EP), in the second pillar by the joint actions of the Coun-
cil, while in the third pillar it was done by the Council’s decision or the act 
of the Council: executive agencies were established by the Commission’s 
decision, based on the special regulation. EURATOM agencies were esta-
in some cases their decisions, and controlling their work plan and the budget. They are gov-
erned by a director and a steering committee.
5  The division of tasks and implementation of European policies is known under the 
term of ‘executive federalism’ – implementation is in general delegated to the MS (former 
Art. 10 TEC, now Art. 4/3 TEU and 291/1 TFEU), but it is not limited only to the national 
level, entailing many tasks at the EU level (direct administration), such as the adoption of 
the implementing measures (the interpretation of rules, the application of rules, the rule 
setting and evaluation, the approval of funds, the extension or specification of funding pro-
grammes, information management, etc.; Hofmann, Türk, 2006: 74; see also Hofmann, 
2010). 
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blished by the decision of the Council as international organisations or by 
the Treaty.6
Although the recent amendments of the EU Treaties have not significantly 
altered the position of agencies in the EU institutional setting, several ad-
vancements in relation to the previous regulation are worth mentioning. 
First of all, the Treaty of Lisbon has abolished the three pillars structure 
of the EU, thus placing the earlier first (EU) and third (JHA) pillar agen-
cies into the common group of ‘decentralised agencies’ under the TFEU, 
while the three agencies of the former second pillar (now Common Forei-
gn and Security Policy), although formally belonging to this group, have 
partially remained isolated.7
Secondly, after 2009, the legal basis for the establishment of EU agencies 
is determined by the Treaties.8 Although the Treaties do not explicitly 
define the basis for their establishment or the basis for the delegation of 
powers to agencies, there are three possible legal grounds for the establis-
hment of agencies as specialised bodies for implementation of the EU 
policies with legal personality: (1) for some agencies, the legal basis is 
enshrined in the Treaties, such as European Defence Agency (Art. 42/3 
and 45 TEU), Eurojust (Art. 85 TFEU) and Europol (Art. 88 TFEU); (2) 
some agencies are based on special provisions contained in the chapters 
6   Along with agencies, there are other decentralised bodies with special level of 
autonomy. Some are established by the Treaties, such as the European Investment Bank 
(Art. 308–309 TFEU and Protocol No. 5), or envisaged by the Treaties, such as the Euro-
pean Data Protection Supervisor (Art. 16 TFEU, Regulation EC 45/2001). The European 
Central Bank and the Court of Auditors have become ‘institutions’ of the Union (Art. 13. 
TEU). There are also agency-like bodies belonging to the group of services or interinstitu-
tional bodies, such as the Publications Office, the European Personel Selection Office, the 
European Administrative School and newly established (in 2011) Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT), as well as the semi-autonomous agency of the European Commis-
sion – the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF; ref. to Art. 325 UFEU). This institutional 
diversity is an indicator of the ‘distributed governance’ as a feature of contemporary gover-
nance (Flinders, 2004: 523; OECD, 2002). 
7   This holds especially to the European Defence Agency, which is based on Art. 
43/3 and Art. 45 TEU, also referred to by the Protocol No 10 on the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation Established by Art. 42 TEU.
8  Hofmann and Morini (2012) argue that in contrast to pluralisation of the executive 
(divided between the Commission, the Council in some cases, as well as other institutions 
such as the ECB, the Court of Auditors and agencies, as well as the MS), the Treaty of Lis-
bon aimed at designing a more unitary structure of the executive, abolishing the three pillar 
structure and defining a single legal system and single typology of legislative acts. 
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regulating the respective EU policy;9 (3) other agencies are based on the 
general provision (Art. 114 TFEU and 352 TFEU; ex 308 TEC)10 which 
allows for the establishment of agencies, as the measures to be taken wit-
hin respective policy. 
Based on these Treaty provisions, agencies are established (a) by the 
Council and the EP regulation under regular legislative procedure, for 
the bulk of the decentralised bodies and agencies; (b) by the decision 
of the Council, for the agencies under CFSP, and (c) by the decision of 
the European Commission based on the Regulation for the executive 
agencies.11 Different legal bases for the establishment of agencies have 
many implications on their functions and structure, such as the proce-
dure of establishment, the tasks, the composition of governing bodies, 
the timeframe, etc. However, some common features of agencies and 
their specificities in comparison to national agencies (e.g. governance 
structure, restricted regulatory powers, provisions concerning specific 
issues), as well as recent attempts to set a common framework for agen-
cies (see infra), indicate to the existence of the  European model of 
agency (Barbieri, Ongaro, 2008).
Thirdly, the Lisbon Treaty has recognised the agencies as the EU level 
administrative organisations extending the scope of certain controlling 
powers and principles onto agencies. One of the most important changes 
is that the agencies’ general and individual acts are explicitly subjected 
to the judicial review (Chamon, 2011) – according to Art. 263 TFEU, 
the ECJ reviews »the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the 
Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties« (Art. 263/1 
9  An example is the research and technological development policy (Art. 182/5 and 
187 TFEU, as the basis for the ERC and EIT), but general provisions are incorporated into 
other policy regulations in the Treaties containing formulation that »the European Parlia-
ment and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives ...« of the respective policy. 
10   Art. 352/1 of the TFEU reads »If action by the Union should prove necessary, 
within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives 
set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Coun-
cil, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent 
of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Where the measures in 
question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it 
shall also act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the con-
sent of the European Parliament.«
11 Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the stat-
ute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Commu-
nity programmes, OJ L 11, 16. 1. 2003. Six executive agencies have been established so far. 
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TFEU),12 and it allows any natural or legal person to »institute procee-
dings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and 
individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct 
concern to them and does not entail implementing measures« (Art. 263/4 
TFEU).13 Moreover, the infringement procedure may be instituted befo-
re the ECJ in case an agency fails to act, after being called upon to act 
and does not do so within two months (Art. 265/1 and 2 TFEU).14 The 
controlling powers are also explicitly delegated to the Court of Auditors, 
the European Ombudsman, and the OLAF with regard to the actions of 
the agencies.15 Finally, the Lisbon Treaty has extended the application of 
the principles of the EU Treaties onto agencies,16 while the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, now an integral part of the Treaties, in its 
provision on the right to good administration (Art. 41) extends this right 
to all institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, requesting 
12  This does not apply to CFSP agencies, notably the European Defence Agency, 
but does apply to other decentralised agencies, including the former third pillar agencies. 
13   According to Art. 263/4 TFEU, »Any natural or legal person may, under the 
conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act 
addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against 
a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing meas-
ures.« Article 263/5 prescribes: »Acts setting up bodies, offices and agencies of the Union 
may lay down specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural 
or legal persons against acts of these bodies, offices or agencies intended to produce legal 
effects in relation to them.« It requires that internal complaint procedure be exhausted; 
some agencies have established the appealing bodies, such as the EASA, the CVPO, or the 
OHIM. See also Chamon, 2011.
14   The infringement procedure may be instituted before the ECJ in case agencies 
fail to act (Art. 265/1 sentence 2), after the agency has been called to act and does not do so 
within two months (Art. 265/2). In addition, in case of silence of administration (including 
agencies), any natural or legal person may lodge a complaint to the ECJ (Art. 265/3). The 
EU Civil Service Tribunal resolves disputes between the Union’s agencies and their serv-
ants (Annex 1 of the Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union).
15  The Court of Auditors examines the accounts of all revenue and expenditure of 
agencies »in so far as the relevant constituent instrument does not preclude such exami-
nation« (Art. 287/1 TFEU). The European Ombudsman is entitled to inspect complaints 
concerning instances of maladministration of the agencies (Art. 228 TFEU). The prevention 
of and fight against fraud is to be conducted also with regard to the agencies (Art. 325/4 
TFEU). 
16  Those principles include the principle of equality (Art. 9 TEU), openness, and ac-
cess to documents (Art. 15 TFEU), personal data protection (Art. 16 TFEU), the principle 
of open, efficient, and independent administration (Art. 298 TFEU).
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for the handling of their affairs »impartially, fairly, and within a reasona-
ble time«.17
With regard to the scope of delegation, in comparison to the national 
agencies, the EU agencies somehow escape the full definition of ‘regu-
latory’ agencies, as independent authorities that autonomously regulate 
certain sector (Geradin, Petit, 2004; Craig, 2006). The legal framework 
for such restricted scope of delegation is set by the EU Treaty provisions 
and their interpretations by the ECJ, and follows the logic of institutional 
balance and the division of powers between the states and the EU. In 
sum, it mainly leaves the implementation, including issuing of secondary 
legislation, in the hands of the MS. Hence, the European agencies have 
only restricted regulatory powers in a narrower sense, usually conducting 
inspections or issuing individual decisions (e.g. OHIM, ECHA, CPVO, 
EASA), or helping the Commission by issuing opinions and recommen-
dations on the Commission’s proposals for legislation (which are usually 
taken seriously by the Commission, having obligation to argument an 
opposing decision), collecting and disseminating information, coordina-
ting the networks of national agencies. 
The widely cited Meroni doctrine was defined by the ECJ in 1958 and 
confirmed in later judgements. In this judgement,18 the ECJ narrowly de-
fined the range of powers that may be delegated to bodies not envisaged 
in the Treaties, although not referring to agencies in particular (Craig, 
2006; Chamon, 2011). Based on the institutional position of the Commi-
ssion as the executive, the ECJ took the view that the delegation of the 
tasks from the Commission to other actors is admissible only if »it invol-
17  The Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes the princi-
ples which apply on the activities of agencies, such as the right to good administration (Art. 
41), the right of access to documents (Art. 42), the right to submission of a complaint to the 
European Ombudsman’s protection (Art. 42). Moreover, Art. 52 explicitly extends the ap-
plication of the Charter’s provisions to the acts taken by agencies. In the 2000 version of the 
Charter, those rights were not applicable to agencies, but only to institutions and bodies of 
the EU, which indicates that the perception of agencies has changed during the past decade. 
18   Case 9/56 Meroni & Co. Industrie Metallurgiche, S.p.A. v. High Authority of 
the ECSC [1957–58] ECR 133. For the detailed description of the judgement, see Craig 
(2006), Dehousse (2008), and Griller and Orator (2007). For subsequent judgements see 
Chamon (2011), who also argues that the Romano case is even more important for the issue 
of delegation to agencies (Case 98/80, Giuseppe Romano v. Institut national d’assurance-
maladie-invalidité [1981] ECR 1259). The Romano Case poses even greater restrictions 
to the delegation to agencies, but it was ruled under the EEC Treaty and referred to the 
delegation by the legislator (the Council), not the Commission. The Romano case has also 
been quoted by the Commission on several occasions (see the Commission’s Report by the 
Working Group 3a, 2001).
330
Anamarija Musa: Reforming the EU Agency Governance ...





















ves clearly defined executive powers, the exercise of which can, therefore, 
be subject to strict review in light of criteria determined by the delegating 
authority«. Therefore, the delegation of »a discretionary power, implying 
a wide margin of discretion« is excluded in all cases (Dehousse, 2008). Si-
milar restricted stance has been taken by the Commission’s Legal Service. 
In sum, the delegation to third bodies may not disturb the institutional 
balance, and therefore it has to involve only the Commission’s proper 
powers. It cannot include empowerment to adopt legislative acts, but only 
their preparation or implementation; the bodies may not be given any 
discretionary powers, the Commission has supervising powers and is res-
ponsible for the delegated authorities (Majone, 2003; Dehousse, 2008). 
Hence, agencies should serve as expert assistants to the Commission.
However, despite formal restrictions of delegation to agencies, many agen-
cies in fact have decision-making powers, at least with regard their autho-
rity to issue decisions in individual cases (also Curtin, 2007), and some 
of the newly established agencies, such as the ESMA or the ACER have 
a significant margin of discretion, including the power to issue binding 
regulation in the respective markets (securities, energy). In addition, the 
role of agencies in policy formulation, including their obligation to issue 
scientific or expert analyses and issue recommendations and opinions to 
the Commission’s proposals, makes them more powerful than formally 
acknowledged, legitimising the Commission’s decisions (Griller, Orator, 
2007: 11). Still, the controlling mechanisms, such as judicial review, might 
compensate for the autonomy they have received even beyond Treaty pro-
visions and judicial doctrines.
3. Back and Forth on the Reform of Agencies 
The interest of EU institutions in agencies, as well as the need for their re-
form, has been gradually acknowledged from 2000 onwards, as the agen-
cies have been discovered as the institutional shortcoming which adds 
to the democratic deficit. From that point forward, there has been an 
ongoing debate over the possible direction and content of the reform of 
the EU agencies, but specific proposals for measures have usually ended 
up in stalemate. However, parallel to these developments, the process 
of agencification has continued unstoppably – from 14 agencies in 1999 
(12 in the first pillar) it increased to 44 agencies in 2013. Still, after the 
financial and economic crisis voiced out stronger demands for the reform 
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that would achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness, and control, the re-
cent initiatives have been more feasible concerning their substance. More 
intensive activities of controlling bodies (the Court of Auditor, the EP) 
have helped to put the agency governance on the reform agenda. A simi-
lar role has been played by recent agency scandals and the parallel reform 
processes in the member states. The following paragraphs contain the 
description of various attempts from 2000 onwards, with the reference to 
possible drivers and main actors in the reform process. 
3.1.  Attempt No. 1: The Commission’s Jump into 
Unknown: Agencies as a Source of the  
Democratic Deficit
An attempt to bring into order the creation, configuration, and operation 
of agencies, as ‘tolerated anomaly’ at the EU level, should be viewed in 
the context of the overall reform of governance and the reform of the exe-
cutive branch, particularly the Commission.19 At the turn of the Millenni-
um, the discussion about democratic deficit was at its peak, mobilising 
politicians, institutions, experts, and academia in search of the response 
to the perceived lack of democracy, legitimacy, and accountability in the 
EU. This concern was augmented by the delegation of already delegated 
tasks20 to the specialised agencies, which were perceived as technocratic 
fortresses deepening the already existing divide between citizens and the 
EU. At the same time, agencies were considered the main instrument for 
the preservation of institutional balance, and the compensation for the 
implementation deficit at the EU level as well as for the weak institutional 
capacity of the Commission and the Parliament (Majone, 1996; Etzioni, 
2007; Moravcsik, 2002).
The initial impetus for the reform emerged in one of the most important 
strategic documents for the EU institutional affairs, namely the White 
19  The Commission itself has been continuously reformed, especially after the 1999 
scandal with Santer’s Commission. The first reform was attempted by Romano Prodi (Tron-
dal, 2006; Egeberg, 2006).
20  The core of the problem concerns the fact that the EU tasks have been delegated 
by the transfer of sovereignty from the states to the European level, but to the institutions 
defined in the Treaties as carriers of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Subse-
quent delegation from the institutions (where the states have their say) to the agencies as 
specialised administrative organisations has been considered as a problem itself. 
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Paper on the European Governance (July 2001),21 which highlighted the 
problem of agencies, their diversified structures and functioning, as well 
as the need for defining conditions and setting the framework for their 
establishment and workings. In its White Paper, the Commission argues 
that the agencies, as a means of policy implementation, are one of the 
most pressing problems of the EU, and that they deserve sufficient atten-
tion, with final output being the creation of legal framework which wo-
uld set the basis for their establishment, functioning, and supervision in 
accordance with the principles of good governance (openness, participati-
on, accountability, effectiveness and coherence, reinforcing the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality). 
The White Paper opted for the following advancements with regard to 
agencies (1) the extension of their scope to the issuing of individual de-
cisions (»should be granted the power to take individual decisions in 
application of regulatory measures«), (2) independence combined with a 
clear framework established by the legislator, (3) regulations creating par-
ticular agencies should »set out the limits of their activities and powers, 
their responsibilities and requirements for openness« (ibid., p. 24). Still, 
the Commission’s proposals do not run across the framework set by the 
Treaties, regarding the restrictions of delegation of powers directly con-
ferred upon the Commission, with regard to general regulatory measures 
(»cannot adopt general regulatory measures«), discretionary powers (deci-
sion making could be allowed only »in areas where a single public interest 
predominates and the tasks ... require particular technical expertise« and 
they cannot be allowed »to arbitrate between conflicting public interests, 
exercise political discretion or carry out complex economic assessments«) 
and only if the effective system of control is in place (ibid., p. 24). In other 
words, the decision-making powers of the EU agencies should be restric-
ted to individual decisions for which special technical expertise is needed 
in order to realise a public interest, and do not contain any arbitration 
21  The Commission of the European Communities (2002) European Governance: 
A White Paper, Brussels, 25. 7. 2001, COM (2001) 428 final. The reform of European gov-
ernance was identified as one of four strategic objectives in early 2000, as a response to two 
different circumstances – the need to adapt the EU governance under existing Treaties (the 
Amsterdam Treaty entered into force on 1 May 1999, while the Nice Treaty was expected to 
be signed in February 2001) and as a basis for a broader debate on the future of Europe in 
view of the future Inter-Governmental Conference.
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between conflicting political or economic interests. In addition, such de-
cisions must be subjected to the effective control mechanism.22
In the White Paper, the Commission determined that in 2002 it would 
»define the criteria for the creation of new regulatory agencies in line with 
the above conditions and the framework within they should operate« and 
»set out the Community’s supervisory responsibilities over such agencies« 
(p. 24). Following this plan, the Commission started an extensive analysis 
and consultation process, as in other areas mentioned by the White pa-
per.23 Based on the detailed Report of the Working group 3a ,which had 
the task to define the analytical report on agencies,24 the Commission 
initiated the consultation process which resulted in the Operating Fra-
22  The decision-making agencies have set their appeal boards ensuring the internal 
control system, while their final decisions are subjected to the judicial control according to 
Art. 263 TFEU.
23  The White Paper proposed a set of initial actions in different areas, such as better 
law making, tripartite arrangements, the use of expert advice, establishing a more systematic 
dialogue with the representatives of regional and local authorities, establishing consultation 
standards, etc. The actions were taken immediately after the WP and consultative processes 
had been launched. The agency issue was also addressed in other areas, such as the Commis-
sion of the European Communities (2002) Communication: European Governance: Better 
Law Making, COM(2002) 275 final, Brussels 5. 6. 2002.
24  European Commission (2001) White Paper on Governance, Work area 3 Improv-
ing the exercise of executive responsibilities: Report by the Working group ‘Establishing a 
framework for decision-making regulatory agencies’ (group 3a) Pilot: F. Sauer, Rapporteur 
A. Quero, June 2001. The Report analyses various elements of agencies, and states that 
»insufficient thought about the place of European agencies in the Community executive has 
prevented the emergence of a clear approach regarding the means of democratic control to 
be provided« (p. 17) and recognises the need for »a common constitutive framework organ-
ising both the autonomy and the control of European agencies« (p. 17). The report high-
lights the main principles of agency governance in the EU: specialisation, autonomy, fairness 
and transparency, limited size of the supervisory body (maximum twenty), equal representa-
tion of the Commission and the member states (parity of the executive), representation of 
the stakeholders, direct democratic accountability (to the European Parliament). It also sets 
out possible governing structure (executive director, supervisory board, appeal bodies, advisory 
committee, and restricted executive board). Special chapter deals with the control mecha-
nisms – procedural control (transparency, due regard for all pertinent opinions, independ-
ence of decision making), democratic control (the EP), executive control (the EC and MS), 
external financial control (the Court of Auditors), and judicial control. The Commission’s 
coordinating and supervising role is defined: »There is consequently a real need for the agen-
cies to be steered and monitored. To do this, there must be the appropriate infrastructure, 
which must necessarily include a decentralised element (supervisory and across-the-board 
directorates-general) and a central element responsible for ensuring homogeneity of action. 
This infrastructure could take the form of a permanent interdepartmental network, consist-
ing of the DGs responsible for the agencies, the DG for Staff and Administration, the DG 
for the Budget and Financial Control, and run by a central structure housed at the Secre-
tariat-General.« (p. 25). 
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mework for the European Regulatory Agencies (December 2002).25 The 
document emphasizes the need for a coherent approach to agencies, des-
pite their diverse functions, in order to achieve effectiveness and tran-
sparency, and thus ensure the unity and the integrity of the executive 
function, which is a prerequisite for the legitimacy, effectiveness, and 
credibility of the Union. In this regard, the creation of the framework for 
EU agencies is aimed at solving the democratic deficit issue. The Opera-
ting Framework distinguishes between executive and regulatory agencies. 
Executive agencies are those responsible for purely managerial tasks (assi-
sting the Commission in implementing financial support programmes and 
subjected to control by Commission).26 Regulatory agencies are »actively 
involved in the executive function by enacting instruments which help to 
regulate a specific sector« (p. 4). The Operating framework defines func-
tional typology of regulatory agencies, as those that provide assistance in 
the form of opinions and recommendations, which provide the technical 
and scientific bases for the Commission’s decisions (EMEA, EFSA), tho-
se that provide assistance in the form of inspection reports, intended to 
enable the Commission to meet its responsibilities as the ‘guardian’ of 
Community law (EMSA), and those empowered to adopt individual de-
cisions legally binding on third parties (OHIM, CPVO, EASA). The Fra-
mework clearly adopts the agency model where organisational and functi-
onal autonomy must be combined with accountability and transparency. 
In the Operating Framework, various elements of agency governance are 
established, such as legal basis; legal personality; location, powers, and 
scope of functions; governance structure (administrative board,27 director, 
25   The Commission of the European Communities (2002) Communication: The 
Operating Framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, COM (2002) 718 final, Brus-
sels 11. 12. 2002. At that moment there were 20 agencies (15 under EC Treaty, one under 
EURATOM, and four in the second and third pillars), with two additional being established.
26   The Commission was able to initiate the legislative procedure establishing the 
framework for those agencies, resulting in adoption of the Council Regulation No. 58/2003 
on executive agencies. 
27   As was the case with the position taken in previous documents’ principles, the 
Commission proposed equal partition of the Commission and Member states (6 by each) 
and three members of interested parties (representatives of the stakeholders). However, 
this idea has not been replicated in any of the agencies, since almost all of them have rep-
resentatives of all the member states (28) and one or two Commission’s representatives. 
These attempts by the Commission to further a completely different managing structure are 
somewhat inconsistent with both agency developments and institutional balance in the EU.
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advisory committee, restricted executive board,28 boards of appeal); finan-
cial and budgetary aspects; other administrative aspects (transparency, 
data protection, business confidentiality, obligation to justify instruments, 
combating fraud, etc.); and control mechanisms (the Commission, politi-
cal supervision by the EP and the Council, administrative supervision by 
the European Ombudsman, judicial control, financial control by the EP, 
the Court of Auditors and the OLAF, compensation of damages, appeal 
mechanism). 
While the Commission had been trying to elaborate on agencies, the 
agencification proceeded, having reached the number of 24 agencies by 
2004, with 13 agencies established in the period 2000–2004, making it 
the most fruitful with regard to agencification. 
3.2.  Attempt No. 2: The Council Fights Back:  
A Failed Framework for Regulatory Agencies
The discussions on the Commission’s 2002 Communication continued in 
2003 and 2004. It was welcomed by both the EP29 and the Council, which 
called upon the Commission to submit a proposal for a framework that 
should be preceded by an inter-institutional agreement. Hence, based 
on the Operating Framework and subsequent discussions, the Commis-
sion presented the Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the Operating 
Framework for the European Regulatory Agencies (DIIA)30 to the EP and 
28  The restricted executive board would consist of the chairperson of the Advisory 
Committee and several senior officials of the agency. It would give the director an opinion 
in specific cases, such as on highly sensitive subjects or if major differences of opinions arise 
in the Advisory Committee. 
29  See Resolution of 13 January 2004, P5_TA (2004)0015 of the European Parlia-
ment. The EP considers that »it is essential to rationalise and standardise the structure of the 
present and future agencies in the interests of clarity, transparency, and legal security’ and 
emphasizes that ‘an urgent review of the present agencies is required.« See also the Council 
Conclusions of 28 June 2004, Doc. 17046/04.
30   The Commission of the European Communities (2005) Draft Interinstitution-
al Agreement on the Operating Framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, COM 
(2005) 59 final, Brussels 25. 02. 2005. The Interinstitutional agreement (IIA) is a legal 
instrument which may have a binding nature if its content implies that all three institutions 
(the Council, the EP, the Commission) have the intent to be committed by it (according 
to the Judgment of the ECJ of 19. 3. 2009, 1996 Commission vs. Council C-25/94, ECR 
I-1469). The IIAs do not preclude later usage of another legal instrument with a binding 
nature, such as a regulation. In previous Treaties, the IIA was mentioned in Art. 218 TEC as 
an instrument of bilateral or multilateral cooperation among institutions, and in the Declara-
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the Council in February 2005. Just as the Operating Framework of 2002, 
the DIIA defines the main principles and elements of agency governance, 
and then drafts the guidelines and rules for them. However, based on the 
recent developments in the EU (development of the regulatory impact as-
sessment and the conflict of interest regulation) and the debates between 
2002 and 2005, the DIIA contains additional elements or additional elab-
oration of some elements, such as the need to provide an impact assess-
ment prior to the establishment of an agency (elements are defined into 
detail), transparency and conflict of interest, good administration, annual 
work programme and activity report, international activities and partici-
pation of third parties, evaluation mechanism, and detailed description of 
financial elements. The DIIA is based on the need to enhance independ-
ence, competence, and credibility of agencies; and to strengthen transpar-
ency and accountability of agencies. It develops a functional typology of 
agencies – decision-making agencies, technical and scientific assistance 
agencies, network agencies, and collection and dissemination of informa-
tion agencies. In addition, the DIIA confirms earlier interpretation on the 
restricted delegation of powers.31
However, the Draft IIA was not accepted by all three partner institutions. 
Although the EP adopted the DIIA by its resolution in December 2005,32 
it was dismissed by the Council without even reaching the stage of politi-
tion no. 3 in relation to Art. 10 TEC adopted in Nice, foreseeing the adoption of IIA in cases 
when it is necessary to achieve good cooperation for facilitating the implementation of the 
Treaties. After Lisbon, the TFEU in Art. 295 states that the EP, the Council, and the Com-
mission are obliged to consult and agree on cooperation, and for that purpose, they are in-
vited to conclude interinstitutional agreements that may have obligatory nature. To achieve 
IIAs is one of the tasks of the Commission defined in Art 17. TEU. The IIAs have different 
titles (Joint Declaration, Declaration, Agreement, Decision, Exchange of Letters, Code of 
Conduct, Modus Vivendi), forms and procedures (formal conciliation, agreed consultation, 
informal understanding), content (some have the purpose to strengthen the EP), and legal 
effects (Hummer, 2007). They are connected to the ‘interinstitutional offices/bodies’ which 
are outside institutions but have functions related to many of them, such as EPSO or Publi-
cations office. For the role of the IIAs in democratisation of the EU see Puntscher Riekman 
(2007); for an extensive study of 123 IIAs in the EU see Hummer (2007).
31  It explicitly excludes the possibility to issue general regulatory measures, to resolve 
issues that need arbitration between the conflicting interests or political discretion, or to 
take decisions in areas explicitly entrusted with the Commission. 
32  The European Parliament Resolution on the Draft Inter-institutional Agreement 
presented by the Commission on the Operating Framework for the European Regulatory 
Agencies, P6_TA(2005)0460, OJ C 285 E/123, 1 December 2005
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cal discussion at the Council or Coreper level.33 Instead, the Legal Service 
of the Council concluded that the use of an inter-institutional agreement 
for the regulation of agencies had no base in the Treaties, and therefore 
was not an appropriate legal instrument. 
However, the EP in its Resolution (OJ C 285E/123 of 22 November 
2006) expressed their regret at the Council’s unwillingness to accept te 
DIIA and called upon the Commission to  intensify its efforts towards 
the Council. The EP welcomed the DIIA but also underlined additional 
mechanisms which had to be incorporated, such as the co-decision pro-
cedure for the establishment of an agency, cost-benefit analysis for each 
agency, the role of the EP and legal protection against the decisions of 
agencies (appeal to the Commission, judicial control). 
Paradoxically, although the DIIA was chosen as a more suitable means 
for reforming agencies in order to please the EP, it was the Council that 
blocked further progress and dismissed the IIA as inappropriate. The ef-
forts made by the EP and the attempts of the Commission’s Legal Service 
to argument its decision to use IIA failed.34
Following the political crisis of the EU (i.e. the failure of the Constitution 
for Europe), the EP called upon the Commission and the Council to stop 
their activities regarding the framework for agencies during the ‘period 
of reflection’, and in 2009 the Draft IIA was formally withdrawn by the 
Commission as obsolete.35 Hence, the agencification process went fur-
ther, untouched by the attempts to increase their accountability, transpar-
ency, or effectiveness, resulting in the establishment of six new agencies 
in the period 2005-2008.
33  The member states discussed the legal form for the framework for agencies within 
the Working group on general affairs of the Council on 27 May 2005 (Council 9735/05) and 
analysed three possible options (to support the IIA, to support more general IIA or to adopt 
the regulation in accordance with Art. 208), but none of the options reached a majority of 
votes.
34  See Document 7861/05. The Legal Service expressed the opinion that IIA was not 
appropriate and went beyond the established cooperation between the institutions, creating 
‘supra-legislative’ legal rules which would commit the legislator pro futuro. Evaluating the 
failure of this attempt, Craig (2006: 162–163; see also Dehousse, 2008) insists on incon-
sistent temporality of the 2002 and 2005 documents, because in 2005 the EU had already 
entered the crisis period which did not favour a strong Commission and the unity and in-
tegrity of the executive function. The Convention on the future of Europe had already set 
up different treatment of the executive function, by its division between the Commission 
and the Council. Another obstacle was the composition of boards, because the MS opposed 
to the decrease in the number of representatives of the states and the exclusion of the EP. 
35  See Withdrawal of Obsolete Commission Proposals, OJ C 71/17, 25. 3. 2009.
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3.3.  Attempt No. 3: All on Board: Moving Forward 
Together 
The deadlock was resolved three years later, with the new initiative by the 
Commission, elaborated in its Communication European Agencies – The 
Way Forward,36 which re-launched a debate on the role of agencies and 
their place in the EU governance. This move was favoured by the emer-
ging economic and financial crisis that thrust the agencies into the spo-
tlight, as one of the sources of inefficiency and overspending. Thus, by its 
Communication, the Commission tried to drum up interest in agencies 
and to promote its ‘framework’ agenda. 
The Commission opted for »a consistent political handling of the 
approach to agencies«. At that point, the EU had reached the number of 
29 regulatory agencies (and 6 executive agencies), employing 3,800 staff, 
and the budget of €1,100m, with more variation with regard to their size, 
structure, and functions. As the main problems of the agencies, the Com-
mission outlined the varied role, structure, and profile, which led to un-
transparent system and rasised doubts with regard to their accountability 
and legitimacy; undefined scope and diversification of functions, which 
may lead to their intrusion into policy-making branches; and the lack of 
elaborated responsibilities of other institutions in relation to agencies (p. 
6). The Commission asked for a common approach to the governance of 
agencies, but with respect to their specific features, in order to achieve 
the basic principles of accountability and sound financial management 
(ibid.). The building blocks of the future common approach should be the 
tasks, operation, and workings of the agencies; accountability and their 
relationship with the other institutions; better regulation; the process of 
establishing and ending; and the communication strategy. The main prin-
ciples include coherence, accountability, participation and openess, and 
good governance. 
As the main activities, the Commission proposed the formation of an 
interinstitutional working group;37 an analysis of availabe studies and re-
ports (including the Commission’s reports and the reports of the Court 
of Auditors); the preparation of a thorough evaluation of agencies taking 
36   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: European Agencies – The Way Forward SEC (2008) 323.
37  In a conciliatory tone, the Commission states »The Commission remains open to 
alternatives to the route of an inter-institutional agreement, whether legally binding or not.« 
(Communication SEC (2008) 323, p. 9)
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a horizontal approach and reporting its results to the EP and the Coun-
cil. It also proposed to withdraw its draft for IIA, to refrain from initia-
ting the formation of new agencies,38 and to undertake a review of the 
Commission’s internal systems governing its relations with agencies, as 
well as the methodology for conducting the impact assessment of agen-
cies (p. 8-9). The EP welcomed the Communication in September 2008 
and insisted on stronger parliamentary control over the formation and op-
eration of agencies and budgetary considerations.39 The Council reacted 
in a similar manner. The new Inter-institutional working group – IIWG was 
established in 2009 with the task to define the common approach.
From this point forward, the agencification proceeded in two directions: 
the setting up of new agencies continued, while simultaneously the activi-
ties aimed at building the common approach were undertaken. Seven new 
agencies were established from the end of 2009 to 2012. Their establish-
ment was justified by the needs of sector policies and urgent economic 
and financial needs.40
Simultaneously, numerous studies and analyses of the European agencies 
or particular issues regarding agencies were conducted by various institu-
tions.41 The Court of Auditors, eager to shed a light on financial aspects 
of agencies, produced the first partial evaluation of EU agencies from the 
38   At that point, the proposals for BEREC and ACER, as well as for the EASO 
were pending, and the amendments to the existing regulations on some agencies had been 
proposed. See e.g. Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators COM (2007) 530 final 
of 19. 9. 2007; European Electronic Communications Market Authority, COM (2007)699 
of 13. 11. 2007.
39  See the Report of the European Parliament on a Strategy for the Future Settle-
ment of the Institutional Aspects of Regulatory Agencies, PE407.635v02-00 and the Euro-
pean Parliament Resolution of 21 October 2008 on a Strategy for the Future Settlement of 
the Institutional Aspects of Regulatory Agencies (2008/2103(INI)), OJ C 15 E/27
40  The new agencies were established in the electronic communication sector (BEREC) 
and energy sector (ACER) in 2009, asylum policy (EASO) in 2009, and in the sector of op-
erational management of large scale IT systems for the area of freedom security and justice 
(eu-LISA) in 2011. Three agencies were established in 2010 in the financial sector (EBA, 
ESMA; EIOPA) forming a complex regulatory structure. The process of network agencifica-
tion was in place, as defined by Levi-Faur (2011) since some of the agencies replaced earlier 
networks governed by the Commission.
41  The Budgetary Control Committee of the European Parliament ordered a com-
parative study of agencies in several member states and in the EU in order to define the best 
practice and issue recommendations. See Jann et al. (2008).
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aspect of ‘good financial management’.42 This study (2008) focused on 
the planning activities, the usage of monitoring instruments and the eval-
uation of results. The conclusions of the report painted a very pessimistic 
picture – the ex ante evaluations were missing, as well as the multiannual 
planning documents, which led to the inefficient allocation of funds, ab-
sence of performance indicators, too descriptive and too detailed reports 
which did not bear relevant information, etc. Hence, the Report proposed 
that agencies define fixed goals and asses the results, as the prerequisites 
for the improvement of their workings. The second Report (2009)43 en-
compassed six executive agencies, also with a negative note – the estab-
lishment of executive agencies was resulting from the need to overcome 
the restrictions regarding employment, and what was missing was sound 
financial management as well as effective supervision by the Commission. 
A third Report focused on the management of the conflict of interest in 
four of the EU agencies,44 also showing underdeveloped practices. 
Following its agenda set in the 2008 Communication, the Commission or-
ganised the external and internal evaluation of agencies. After an external 
study in 2008,45 which was aimed at more transparency, the complex eval-
uation was produced in 2009, focusing on 26 agencies, employing 4,698 
staff and having €1.2m budgets.46 The Report, which was to be used as a 
basis for the work of the IIWG, showed that the agencies were established 
as a response to different political interests, and that they lacked perfor-
mance management, periodical evaluations, and a unified structure and 
supervision. The study recommended several important mechanisms for 
agency governance, such as periodical evaluations, merging the agencies 
with complementary tasks, greater transparency in defining the location 
of agencies, reducing administrative burdens, etc. Finally, an extensive 
42  The European Court of Auditors (2008) The European Union’s Agencies: Getting 
Results. Special Report No. 5,  http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/8429032.PDF
43  The European Court of Auditors (2009) Delegating Implementing Tasks to Exe-
cutive Agencies: A Successful Option? Special Report No. 13. http://eca.europa.eu/portal/
pls/portal/docs/1/8034812.PDF
44   The European Court of Auditors (2012) Management of Conflict of Interest in 
Selected EU Agencies, Special Report No. 15. http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1 
/18686746.PDF The agencies studied are EASA, EFSA, EMA, and ECHA.
45   Euréval (2008) Meta-study on decentralised agencies: Cross-cutting analysis of 
eva luation findings. Final Report, September 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_ge-
neral /evaluation/docs/study_decentralised_agencies_en.pdf 
46  Rambøll-Euréval-Matrix (2009) Evaluation of the EU decentralised agencies in 
2009. http://europa.eu/agencies/regulatory_agencies_bodies/index_en.htm 
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horizontal evaluation was conducted with regard to 31 elements concern-
ing the establishment and design of agencies, their financing, supervision, 
and relations with other institutions. 
Shortly, a new step was taken by the institutions with the aim of defining a 
common approach to agencies. In July 2012, three institutions issued the 
Joint Statement on decentralised agencies, which signified the first polit-
ical agreement between the institutions by adoption of the Common Ap-
proach to Decentralised Agencies47 based on the evaluations and conclu-
sions made by the IIWG, thus forming the (non-binding) basis for further 
decisions, but also the guidelines for the agencies to adapt their workings. 
The Common Approach included 66 points on certain aspects of the 
establishment and operation of the EU agencies, aimed at harmonizing 
and creating a uniform model. This model need not necessarily be for-
mally formulated, but ought to be in accordance with the principles of 
good governance, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and accounta-
bility, and aimed at achieving direct political and economic results. These 
principles and recommendations provided for several ways to improve 
the system agencies in the EU, as well as an objective assessment of the 
impact before the establishment of the agency, the criteria for selection 
of the agency headquarters, regular comprehensive evaluation, prior and 
subsequent evaluations of the programs and activities of the agency, the 
introduction of sunset clauses, the connection between the multi-annual 
plans and funding of agencies, the appropriate relationship between the 
agencies’ tasks and its resources (financial, human), as well as the  uni-
form management structure.48 These elements are forms of the ex ante or 
ex post control aimed at enhancing accountability or effectiveness.
By issuing a Joint Statement, the institutions committed the Commission 
to draw up a plan with a specific timetable for the planned initiatives, 
taking into account the possible particularities of individual agencies. The 
Commission adopted the Roadmap in December 2012,49 defining main 
47  Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the Euro-
pean Commission on decentralised agencies, 19 July 2012 http://europa.eu/agencies/docu-
ments/joint_statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf The Joint statement relates to 
31 agencies, including neither the three agencies under CFSP nor executive agencies.
48  The draft proposal of the Joint Statement from June 2012 included the establish-
ment of the interagency committee for revision and impact assessment, but this proposal 
was not included in the final version. 
49  European Commission (2012) Roadmap on the Follow-up to the Common Ap-
proach on EU Decentralised Agencies (19 December 2012) http://europa.eu/agencies/
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goals of the Commission (»more balanced governance, improved efficien-
cy and accountability, and greater coherence«) and elaborating on the 
implementation of the Common Approach. 
In comparison to the existing structure and workings of agencies, the 
Roadmap brought several important innovations, with expected time of 
realization (in the period 2013–2014) and promoted a clear definition of 
tasks and uniform composition of management boards (one representa-
tive of each MS, two representatives of the Commission).50 Management 
boards should have a supervisory role, especially for the evaluation of in-
ternal and external audits, etc., and a counterpart to the executive direc-
tor. The MS were invited to pay attention to the managerial skills of the 
candidates for the board and the director – they need to possess certain 
competences to be engaged. The alert-warning system was proposed – the 
Commission should alert the EP and the Council in case »it has serious 
reasons for concern that an agency’s Management Board is about to take 
decisions which may not comply with the mandate of the agency, may 
violate EU law or be in manifest contradiction with EU policy objectives« 
(p. 2). In order to increase efficiency and accountability, there should 
be synergy among agencies (including shared services, possible mergers, 
etc.). Drawing up of multi-annual plans was recommended, as well as the 
development of sound key performance indicators for both the agency 
and the director. Coherent policy guidelines for the prevention and man-
agement of conflicts of interest must be developed.
By defining a Common Approach, the new agency model in the EU has 
been indicative for the period ahead; especially in terms of explicit stance 
that creating a formal legal framework for agencies (regulation) is not 
necessary but it can be an alternative to the definition of the existing rules 
and standards, and the development of guidelines and good practices. The 
66 points of the Common approach and the Roadmap suggest that the 
EU has come to an understating on horizontal guidelines for the estab-
lishment, structure, operation, funding, and control of agencies. In addi-
tion, the Commission is to prepare a horizontal standard procedure for 
founding acts for agencies and harmonization of decision rules for man-
agement boards, and revise the horizontal regulations (Staff Regulations, 
Financial Framework Regulation). Given the functional diversity of agen-
documents/2012-12-18_roadmap_on_the_follow_up_to_the_common_approach_on_eu_
decentralised_agencies_en.pdf
50   »Where appropriate, the European Parliament may designate one member and 
stakeholders may have a limited number of representatives.« (The Roadmap, p. 2)
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cies, as well as the political sensitivity of the agency model in the EU, the 
intended direction of development in terms of creating a common set of 
rules and guidelines and best practices has proven to be the least painful 
way to harmonize the features of a European agency model. In addition, 
seven agencies established in the fourth wave, and influenced by the rec-
ommendations of these documents, show that there has been a relatively 
similar approach to the regulation of certain issues, particularly transpar-
ency, financial management, data protection, conflicts of interest, and, 
in particular, the evaluation agency, which was generally not provided for 
the previously established agencies. However, a considerable diversity in 
governance structure is still present, primarily in the prescribed bodies 
(their composition and the method of appointment), but it is the con-
sequence of the role of different agencies in European governance, their 
primary task, and the nature of individual policies. Still, the importance of 
political factors in the establishment and decisions on individual elements 
of agency governance substantially affects the formation of the European 
agency models.
Parallel with the work of the Commission and other institutions to im-
prove the agency governance, other European controllers attempted to 
shed light on the agency. Their attempts have also been influenced by 
recent agency scandals, often related to financial abuse and unjustifiably 
high costs,51 or to direct relationship with customers or regulated enti-
ties,52 as well as to other irregularities. Reports from OLAF show that 
some agencies are under investigation, particularly with regard to their 
employment practices. In her 2011 programme, the European Ombuds-
man announced that visits to the EU agencies would be initiated in order 
to promote good governance and sharing the best practice among agen-
cies.53
51   Several agencies had problems with receiving budget approval because of high 
and unjustified costs or inadequate public procurement system (e.g. EEA, EMEA). EFSA 
had unjustified costs for the management board meetings – almost €100,000 per session 
(European Parliament, Press Release, 27. 3. 2012).
52   Certain scandals received significant media attention, such as the EEA case 
where the executive director had a close connection to the civil society organisation whose 
members enjoyed expensive education benefits from the agency, or the EFSA management 
board member who resigned due to the conflict of interest. 
53  According to the Report of the European Ombudsman, the complaints on agenci-
es represent 10 per cent of all complaints that lead to investigation. European Ombudsman 
(2011) Annual Report 2011, http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreports.
faces
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4. Discussion and Conclusion
In the preceding chapters, the development of the framework of agency 
governance in the EU has been presented. Numerous analyses have in-
dicated the diversification of agency governance, justified by the political 
factors and lack of an appropriate framework. The lack of appropriate 
instruments of sound financial management and efficient control mecha-
nisms have been particularly noticeable, which is in sharp contrast to the 
new public management justification of agencies – they should be con-
trolled precisely through the instruments of performance control, finan-
cial management, focused control by other supervising institutions, and 
greater transparency, which are to compensate for the weaker external 
control by political bodies. In the European context, with the weak con-
trolling mechanism based on the giant and politicised managing boards, 
the use of these instruments is of even greater importance. However, the 
agencification in the EU strongly resembles similar process in the mem-
ber states; in most countries, agencification has been a result of the NPM 
doctrine and the regulatory state concept which was not based on the 
strong legal framework that would pressure for greater and more efficient 
control. As a response to the strong decentralisation process, since 2000, 
the post-NPM agenda has sought to improve inter-organisational coordi-
nation and to centralize control, to advance ethical norms and accounta-
bility mechanisms, and to set clear guidance as to how to achieve greater 
effectiveness focusing on results. The post-NPM approach has not been 
intended to replace, but to cure those features of administrative reform 
that NPM failed to observe and prevent. This has evoked the attempts to 
create more formal agency models in many countries, in order to meet 
the post-NPM requirements, by setting stricter rules on the establish-
ment, functioning, and the organisation of agencies. The new direction of 
development has been provoked not only by the modification of the doc-
trinal frame (from NPM to post-NPM), but has also had its source in the 
changed external circumstances, especially in the economic and political 
crisis which targeted the agencies, as decentralised administrative units, 
as one of the most important causes of increased spending, ineffective-
ness, and lack of political accountability. 
The efforts to prepare the EU agency model have been influenced by po-
litical factors. First, the perceived democratic deficit had to be addressed 
by tackling the problem of numerous agencies that had been functioning 
below the radar adding to the blurred EU governance. In addition, polit-
ical actors pursued their own agendas which would allow them to exert 
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greater control and gain greater power. As the description shows, the in-
terests of political actors were conducive to particular elements of the new 
framework – the Commission’s efforts to gain more control over agencies, 
as expressed in the 2002 and 2005 documents (Operating Framework 
and DIIA) were stopped by the Council’s (member states’) unwillingness 
to give up its own power over agencies. The EP, however, favoured a more 
centralised approach, hoping for stronger influence on the agencies.54 The 
inability of political actors to solve the interest conflict led to a stalemate 
and the agency problem was put aside for a while. 
The deadlock was resolved after the economic crisis had changed the pref-
erences of actors, especially the Council, who became aware of the need 
to rationalise agency governance – to cut spending and to set the basis for 
more effective agency governance. The public perception of agencies as 
uncontrolled users of public funds (e.g. member states’ money) was even 
worsened by scandals that appeared in the media. Hence, there was a 
need for greater transparency and accountability of agencies to respond 
to the democratic deficit, but also as a prerequisite for stricter financial 
control and greater effectiveness. However, unlike with the previous at-
tempts, the progress could be made only as a compromise solution, with 
the Commission’s appetite put under control and greater influence of the 
member states in the process. As a consequence of the 2012 Joint Deci-
sion and the Roadmap, several documents were prepared during 2013, 
setting clear guidelines and the framework for the establishment and or-
ganisation of agencies. In sum, the changed interests of political actors, 
which favoured the need to resolve the problem of agencies as a part of 
the economic crisis puzzle, have stimulated taking fresh approach in the 
creation of the new agency model. However, the logic of consequence 
(calculation of actors; March, Olsen, 1989) was soon complemented by 
the logic of appropriateness – the new value perspective promoted in the 
good governance doctrine favoured greater accountability, stakeholders’ 
control, the management of conflict of interest, and a transparent func-
tioning of public organisations. 
With regard to the content of measures taken or proposed, the elements 
presented in final documents point towards the attempt to achieve more 
54  There has been an informal debate on possible merger of agencies in the area of 
employment and training (Cedefop, ETF, Eurofound, EU-OSHA) and in the area of hu-
man rights (FRA, EIGE, EPSO), since they have complementary tasks. It is assumed that 
the mergers would allow for financial savings and greater effectiveness. However, given the 
different locations of the agencies, some Member States oppose the mergers. 
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control in agency governance, but also towards more managerial approach 
to agencies – e.g. sound financial management, the need to connect the 
planning, the outcomes, and the allocated funds (performance manage-
ment), more elaborated impact assessment of the establishment of agen-
cies, periodical evaluation of agencies, stricter control of appointments 
and composition of boards. In addition, democratic and political control 
is expected to be enhanced through greater transparency and more pro-
nounced role of the controlling institutions, such as the EP and the Court 
of Auditors. Finally, legal control has been strengthened, especially with 
regard to the explicit ECJ’s authority to review agencies’ decisions, but 
also by the stronger reliance on the ex ante control based on legal instru-
ments, such as the issuing of guidelines, frameworks, and other soft law 
instruments.
The formal adoption of the Common Approach to agencies supports the 
expectations on relative approximation of the agency model, especially 
in terms of form and structure, as well as the introduction of mecha-
nisms that should ensure good governance and increase the efficiency 
of the agency, and thus justify the delegation of powers to European 
agencies, either by the European institutions, or by the member states 
themselves. The elements of agency governance, as defined in the final 
documents, might also be of use in the agency-related reforms that are 
continuing in the member states, with adjustments to their particular 
circumstances, which could add to the Europeanization argument. In-
spired by the practices of various MS (uploading), the proposals for the 
improvements of agency governance in the EU have a power to become 
the source of inspiration to the MS in the downloading direction of 
Europeanization (Radaelli, 2003). However, the fact that the proposed 
model of the EU agency governance indicates the turn towards greater 
role of the controlling bodies (court, parliament, auditing institutions) 
and more frequent use of managerial practices (multi-annual planning, 
performance management, professional leadership), as well as of the 
improved better regulation practices (impact assessments, evaluations), 
indicates that the agency governance is not an isolated issue but a part 
of a bigger governance problem that has to be addressed in order to have 
agencies functioning properly.
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Appendix: European Agencies (2013)
2013 The Agency Year Seat/Country European Policy
Decentralised agencies
European Centre for the  
Development of Vocational  
Training (CEDEFOP)




European Foundation for the  
Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions  
(EUROFOUND)
1975 Dublin / Ireland social policy / workers’ mobility 
European Training Foundation 
(ETF) 1990 Turin / Italy 
foreign relations / 
social policy 






European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction  
(EMCDDA)
1993 Lisbon /  Portugal 
public health,  
social policy, crime
European Medicines Agency  




European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work  
(EU-OSHA)
1994 Bilbao / Spain public health / social policy 
Office for Harmonisation in 
the Internal Market (Trade 
Marks and Designs) (OHIM)
1994 Alicante / Spain intellectual  property / market
Community Plant Variety 
Office (CPVO) 1994 Angers / France
intellectual  
property /  
movement of goods
Translation Centre for the 






European Police Office  
(EUROPOL) 1995
The Hague / The 
Netherlands 
home affairs and 
justice cooperation 
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European Police College  
(CEPOL) 2000 Bramshill / UK 
home affairs and 
justice cooperation
European Union’s Judicial  
Cooperation Unit (EURO-
JUST)
2002 The Hague / The Netherlands
home affairs and 
justice cooperation
European Food Safety  
Authority (EFSA) 2002 Parma / Italy 
public health, 
agriculture 




transport / internal 
market 





European Network and 






information /  
internal market
European Centre for  
Disease Prevention and  
Control (ECDC)
2004 Stockholm / Sweden public health 
European Railway Agency 
(ERA) 2004 Lille / France 
transport / internal 
market
European GNSS Supervisory 
Authority (GSA) 2004
Brussels /  
Belgium 
transport / internal 
market
European Agency for the 
Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External 
Borders (FRONTEX)
2004 Warsaw / Poland 
free movement 
of people / crime 
control 
Community Fisheries Control 
Agency (CFCA) 2005 Vigo / Spain internal market





property / internal 
market 
European Fundamental Rights 
Agency (FRA)
2007 
(1997) Vienna / Austria 
free movement of 
people / human 
rights 
European Institute for Gender 
Equality (EIGE) 2006




Agency for Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) 2009
Ljubljana / 
Slovenia energy policy 
Body of European Regulators 
for Electronic Communica-
tions (BEREC)




European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) 2010 Valetta / Malta
border safety / 
internal affairs 
European Banking Authority 
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European Insurance and  
Occupational Pensions  
Authority (EIOPA)
2010 Frankfurt / Germany
financial sector/ 
insurance 
European Securities and  
Markets Authority (ESMA) 2010 Paris / France 
financial 
sector 
European Agency for  
Operational Management of 
Large Scale IT systems in the 
area of freedom, security and 
justice (IT-Agency)
2011 Tallinn / Estonia




European Union Institute for 
security studies (ISS) 2001 Paris / France
common foreign 
and security policy
European Union Satellite 
Centre (EUSC) 2001
Torrejón de 
Ardoz / Spain 
common foreign 
and security policy
European Defence Agency 
(EDA) 2004









European Joint Undertaking 
for ITER and the Development 










Executive Agency for  









Education, Audiovisual and 








40. Executive Agency for Health and Consumers (EAHC)
2005
(–2015)
Luxembourg consumer health and protection
41.
Trans-European Transport 




Brussels /  
Belgium
energy and  
transport 
42.
European Research Council 













European Institute of  
Innovation and Technology 
(EIT)
2008 Budapest / Hungary research, economy
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REFORMING THE EU AGENCY GOVERNANCE:  
MORE CONTROL, GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY
Summary
Agencification in the European Union, as in most of its member states, has 
mainly proceeded without firm legal framework and horizontal measures, lead-
ing to the creation of numerous more or less independent specialised adminis-
trative organisations with diverse structure and functions. The EU institutional 
setting and the nature of EU regulation have represented powerful engines of 
agencification. However, despite their importance for the EU governance, the 
existence of agencies had not been envisaged or recognised in the primary legis-
lation before the Lisbon Treaty, while the more extensive data on them emerged 
only recently, due to the attempts to put agencies under stricter control. The pa-
per aims to analyse the elements of the EU agency governance and to highlight 
the direction of the recent reforms of EU agencies. The paper outlines the ration-
ale and legal basis for agencies, then presents a short overview of the development 
of agencification, and finally gives insight into recent agency reforms. Although 
the EU agencies, exercising various tasks in different policy areas, have been 
perceived as being diverse, the recent developments inspired by the political and 
economic reasons show the evolving construction of common norms and practices 
for agencies, which should enable more control and greater accountability of 
agencies. It is possible that these developments will influence the agency models 
in the EU member states. 
Key words: European agencies, agencification, EU governance
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REFORMA EUROPSKOG AGENCIJSKOG UPRAVLJANJA:  
VIŠE KONTROLE, VEĆA ODGOVORNOST
Sažetak
Agencifikacija se u Europskoj uniji, kao i u većini država članica, odvijala bez 
čvrstog zakonodavnog okvira i horizontalnih mjera, što je dovelo do osnivanja 
više-manje neovisnih specijaliziranih upravnih organizacija raznolikih struk-
tura i funkcija. Institucionalni okvir EU i priroda Unijine pravne regulacije 
bili su moćni zamašnjaci agencifikacije. Međutim, unatoč njihovoj važnosti za 
upravljanje Unijom, postojanje agencija nije bilo predviđeno niti prepoznato 
u europskom pravu prije Lisabonskog ugovora, a opširnija regulacija agencija 
pojavila se tek nedavno, prilikom nastojanja da ih se stavi pod stroži nadzor. 
U radu se analiziraju elementi europskog agencijskog upravljanja te prikazuje 
smjer nedavnih reformi agencija u EU. Daje se argumentacija i zakonski temelj 
za osnivanje agencija, nastavlja se kratkim pregledom razvoja agencifikacije te 
se, na kraju, prikazuju nedavne reforme na području agencija. Iako se agencije 
EU, koje izvršavaju raznolike zadatke u različitim područjima javnih politi-
ka, smatraju diversificiranim tijelima, recentni događaji potaknuti političkim i 
ekonomskim razlozima pokazali su da se i dalje stvara struktura zajedničkih 
pravila i prakse za sve agencije, što bi trebalo omogućiti stroži nadzor nad njima 
i njihovu veću odgovornost. Moguće je da će ta pravila utjecati i na agencijske 
modele država članica Unije.
Ključne riječi: agencije Europske unije, agencifikacija, europsko upravljanje
